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FOREWORD
This is the first annual reportpertainingto the flight serviceevaluationof
advanced composite components on a series of Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.
(Bell) Model 206L LongRanger helicopters. The work is jointly sponsoredby
NASA-LangleyResearch Center and the StructuresLaboratory,USARTL (AVRADCOM)
under ContractNASI-15279. A prior report (Referencei) describesthe design,
fabrication,and testing of the components. This report covers the period
from approximatelyFebruary 1982 through July 1983. The NASA-LangleyTech-
nical Monitor for this program is Mr. Donald J. Baker. The Bell Project Engi-
neer is Mr. HerbertZinberg.
Acknowledgementis made of the 206L commercialoperatorswho are participating
in this program and who are identifiedin the body of the report. The program
would not be possiblewithout their aid and cooperation.
Certain materials are identified in this publication to adequately specify
which materialswere used. In no case does such identificationimply recom-
-- mendation or endorsementof the material by NASA or USARTL (AVRADCOM),nor
does it imply that the materials are necessarilythe only ones or the best
ones availablefor the purpose.
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FLIGHTSERVICEEVALUATIONOF COMPOSITE
COMPONENTSON THE BELL HELICOPTER
MODEL 206L: FIRST ANNUAL FLIGHT SERVICEREPORT
By
HerbertZinberg
Bell HelicopterTextron, Inc.
Fort Worth, Texas
SUMMARY
This is the first flight servicereport on the advanced compositecomponents
that have been placed in serviceon 206L JetRangerhelicoptersin the contin-
ental United States, Canada, and Alaska. The report covers the period from
-- approximately1 February 1982 to 1 August 1983. A previous report (Reference
i) describes the design, fabrication,and testing of the four components,
which are the 206L forward fairing, litter door, baggage door, and vertical
fin.
The status of 34 sets of components is discussedin this report. Approxi-
mately 27,500 flight hours were accumulated on the components on 1 August
1983. The high-timehelicopteraccumulated2244 hours.
Three sets of components and one-fifthof the exposure coupons were returned
and tested. Neither the graphite/epoxycoupons nor the graphite/epoxyfin
showed any structural degradation. However, the Kevlar/epoxy coupons and
doors showed a loss of strengthand/or stiffness. The strengthloss was most
prevalent in the matrix-dominatedproperties. This was especiallynoticeable
in the specimensthat experiencedlong-termexposure in the cold climatesof
Canada and Alaska.
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The actual field problemshave been nominal. The only significantproblemwas
that of thermal buckling of four litter doors on helicoptersthat spent the
summer parked in the desert sun outside of Phoenix, Arizona. The cause for
the buckleswas determined,and remedialactionwas taken.
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i. DISTRIBUTIONOF SERVICEEVALUATIONKITS
The objective of this program is to evaluate 40 sets of advanced composite
helicopter airframe components under commercial service environmentsfor an
extendedperiod of time on the Bell 206L JetRanger. Reference1 describesthe
components, which are the forward fairing, litter door, baggage door, and
vertical fin. The first three are made from Kevlar/epoxy. The fin is made
predominantlyfrom graphite/epoxy. It is planned to keep most of these parts
in service for five years. However, NASA has the option of extending the
_ service period for an additionalfive years. As part of the evaluationpro-
cess, a certainnumber of parts are removedafter specifiedlengthsof service
for static test to chart any timewisedegradationof the materials.
Table 1 of Reference1 shows the distributionof kits to the commercialopera-
tots. Table 1 of this report shows the kits that have been installed,and
specifiesthe number of hours on each kit as of 1 August 1983.
A summary of Table 1 shows that 34 helicoptersreported an accumulationof
27,517 flight hours, for an average of 809.3 hours per helicopter. The air-
craft with the most hours operated in the vicinity of the Gulf Coast and had
_ accumulated2244 flight hours. A breakdownof hours by geographicallocation
is given in Table 2.
The program specifies that 40 ship sets be tested,but Table 1 only reports
the status of 34 sets. One set was scheduledto be installed in Alaska in
-- August 1983, and a second set is scheduledto be installedin September,so no
time has been accrued on these. One of the two aircraft that are operatedby
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police was stationed in Northern Labrador and was
not available for inspection. Two sets of components assigned to Houston
Helicoptershave not, as yet, been installedbecause of lack of work for the
aircraftto which they have been assigned.
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TABLE i. FLIGHT SERVICERECORD OF 206L COMPOSITECOMPONENTS
AS OF 1 AUGUST 1983
No. of Heli
Kits Date Serial No. Hr on
Operator Location Deliv Installed No. Components Remarks
IslandHelicopters Garden City, 3 08/81 45101 1413 Returnedfor scheduled
New York static test (7/83)
09/81 45450 1495.6 Light pulled out of
fin cap. Light re-
10/81 46601 1297.3 placed
ERA Helicopters Anchorage, 5 11/81 45113 612
Alaska 12/81 45108 506
05/82 45115 391
- 45109 None InstalledAug 1983
- 45114 None Not yet installed
Trans-Quebec Les Cedres 5 05/81 45141 870 Removed for scheduled
Helicopters (Montreal), static test (7/82)
Canada 05/81 45143 1099
04/83 45134 None Helicopterplaced into
serviceJuly 1983
11/81 45206 328
11/81 45439 282
Royal Canadian Ottawa, Canada 2 12/81 45086 749.3
MountedPolice 11/82 45414 Not Aircraftwas out of
available touch at report time
Ministry of Transport Ottawa,Canada 2 06/82 45083 395
Canada 04/83 46608 300
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TABLE i. (Concluded)
No. of Heli
Kits Date Serial No. Hr on
Operator Location Deliv Installed No. Components Remarks
Air Services Scottsdale, 5 05/82 45418 140.1 Thermalbuckles
International Arizona 05/82 45614 169.9 Thermalbuckles
05/82 45607 23.2 Thermalbuckles
05/82 45609 612.9
04/82 45608 484.8 Thermalbuckles
HoustonHelicopters Pearland 3 04/82 45535 112
(Houston), Not
Texas assigned Kits to be installed
Not when aircraft get work
assigned
CommercialHelicop- Lafayette, 2 02/82 45330 1586
ters Louisiana 02/82 45331 - See text for
03/82 45442 490 explanation
PetroleumHelicopters Lafayette, 5 06/81 45373 879 Lightningstrike.
Inc. Louisiana Returned for scheduled
static test (6/82)
08/81 45181 1301.1
11/81 45160 1491.5
10/81 45367 2244.1
10/81 45305 1940.4
Air Logistics New Iberia, 5 03/82 45436 1244.5
Louisiana 02/82 45378 937.1
07/82 45266 847.2
08/82 45546 1202.7
11/82 45449 401.9
Heli-Voyageur Val d'0R 3 03/82 45017 551
Quebec 04/82 45028 643
04/82 45085 476
TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTIONOF HELICOPTERSBY GEOGRAPHICALLOCATION
Location No. of Helicopters Hours Accumulated
NortheasternU.S. & EasternCanada 10 8,455
Central Canada 3 1,444
Alaska 3 1,509
Southwest(desert)U.S. 5 1,431
Gulf Coast 13 14,678
Finally, one set was on a helicopterassigned to CommercialHelicopters. The
aircraft was being transported by truck When the rotor mast struck a low
bridge. Host of the aircraftwas destroyed. However, the two compositedoors
and the fairing escaped damage and were transferredfrom S/N 45331 to S/N
45442.
It is emphasized that although the aircraft are owned by operatorswho are
locatedin certaingeographicalareas, there is no certaintythat the aircraft
_ will always be operated close to their home bases. In fact, they are often
sent out for extended periods of time to areas whose environmentsare differ-
ent from their home environments. One such example is the five sets of com-
ponents sent to Air Services Internationallocatedin Phoenix, Arizona. The
first summer, four helicoptersremained in the hot, dry Phoenix environment,
but the fifth one was operated in the cool Wyoming-Montanaarea. Another
example is the helicoptersoperated by Trans-Quebec. The operator is located
-- in a suburb of Montreal, but two of their five helicoptersspent most of one
winter in the vicinity of Newfoundland. These examplesare given to emphasize
the fact that, althoughthe home bases of the componentsare known, the compo-
nents may be sent to remote areas on short notice. One exception is the
components assigned to the Gulf Coast. These normally remain in the area
because they are assigned to offshoreoil explorationand production.
From a practical standpoint,it has not been possible to phase the components
into service as rapidly as desired; and there is a gap of about two years
_ between the time the first ones went into service,and the scheduleddate for
the last ones. This timespreadcan be partially attributed to a slowing of
the national economy -- most especially in the oil industry. Most operators
wait until their 1200-hourmajor overhaulto install the compositeparts. At
that time, they have the helicoptersin a down status,with mechanicssched-
uled to work on them. Because of the slow workload,there is a long period of
time between 1200-houroverhauls,and this has slowed installations. It also
has the effect of not accumulatingflight hours as rapidly as desired. All
components, however, are scheduled to be in flight status by the winter of
1984.
2. TESTS OF ENVIRONMENTALLYEXPOSEDCOMPOSITES
2.1 TESTS OF FLIGHT COMPONENTS
After approximatelyone year of service, three sets of componentswere re-
turned to Bell for static testing. Componentswere returnedfrom IslandHeli-
copters (S/N 45101) after 1413 hours, Trans-QuebecHelicopters (S/N 45141)
after 870 hours, and PetroleumHelicopters(S/N45373) after 879 hours of ser-
vice. The resultsof the tests to date are shown in Table 3, and are compared
with the preservice tests which were the average of the certificationand
selected production components. The preservice tests are describedin Refer-
ence i. In addition,deflectionmeasurementswere made on the litter door and
forward fairing that were returned from Island Helicopters. These too are
comparedwith preservicedeflectionmeasurements.
TABLE 3. RESIDUAL STRENGTHCOMPARISONOF COMPOSITEAIRFRAME
_ COMPONENTSAFTER (APPROX)ONE YEAR SERVICE
_ ResidualStrength
PreserviceStrength
879 hr 870 hr 1413 hr
Component Average Minimum Av - 3a Gulf Coast Canada New York
Fwd fairingI 2.73 1.73 0.84 1.8 2.5 1.89
Baggage door 629 551 406 795 473 275
Litter door 1208 1176 927 1009 980 1115
Vertical fin 2020 1872 1662 2497 2219 2100
IPressure,psi. All other data in pounds.
An examinationof Table 3 reveals that the graphite fin has, thus far, shown
no strength degradation. In fact, the minimum strength of the three fins is
-- higher than the average of the preservice tests. All three fins failed in
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_ bending in the same manner as shown in Figure 23 of Reference i. Accordingly,
it is concluded that the graphite fins were unaffected by a year of field
service.
No conclusions can, as yet, be drawn from the tests of the Kevlar components.
The three forward fairings failed below the average of the preservice fair-
ings, but not below the minimum value; so on that basis, it can be said that,
thus far, there has been little or no loss of strength due to service. Fail-
ure of two of the fairings was by local tearing of the buildup structure at an
aft latch. The third fairing, from Island Helicopters, failed in bending at
the inner radius as shown in Figure I. Both failure modes have been observed
in the preservice tests.
Figure i. Static test failureof forwardfairingafter a year's
flight service. Failure is compressionbendingof
inner skin.
Figure 2 shows the load-deflectioncurve of the top centerlineof the forward
fairing and compares it with the load-deflectionof a fairing (Referencei)
used for certification. Both sets of data were for a point located 14.5
inches forwardof the aft end of the fairing. The figure shows that there was
no change in stiffness after 1413 hours of service in the metropolitanNew
York City area.
.4O
After 1413 hr
servicein New York
City environment
2o //
• Preservice
test
.i0___
0 I I I I i _ I I
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Deflection (in)
-- Figure 2. Load-deflectioncurve of forwardfairingafter
1413 flighthours in New York City area.
The baggage door tests show a large scatter in both failing strength and
failuremodes. The door that was locatedon the Gulf Coast failed at a higher
load than the average of the preservicedoors. Failure occurred when one of
the hinges broke. This is similar to the preservice failures (Referencei,
Figure 22). The door that returnedfrom Canada failed in compressivebuckling
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-- of the inner skin at a load that was lower than the minimum of the preservice
tests. It was not possible to get a photographwhich showed the buckle. Its
location could be found by feeling a separationof the inner skin from the
honeycombcore. The failurewas approximatelyat the fore and aft center of
the door and extended for most of its width.
The baggage door that was returned from Island Helicopters in the New York
City area failed at a low load, and the mode of failure was different from
that of any previous baggage door. A loud noise was heard when the distribu-
ted load reached 275 pounds, and the door deflectednoticeably. There was no
observablefailureafter the load was removed,but the outer (tension)surface
felt soft. Local tapping, followed by ultrasonic inspectionrevealed large
areas of disbondingbetween the outer skin and core. Figure 3 shows the areas
of disbonding.
It cannot be said, for certain, whether the low failing load on this baggage
door was caused by a year's field service or by a poorly manufacturedbond
between the outer skin and core. It may be significant that there was no
failure on the compression side. Also, in the manufacture of the baggage
door, an adhesive was used between the inner skin and core, but only the
matrix resin was used to bond the outer skin to the core. This is the only
baggage door to fail in this manner in static test. There have been, however,
occasions when the outer skins disbonded from the core in service. This is
discussedin Section4.3.
Table 3 shows an apparent loss in strengthfor the exposed litter doors. All
three of the doors failed at a lower load than the minimum of the preservice
-- doors; and the one located in Canadawas only 6% stronger than the (average-
30) preservicestrength. All failureswere caused by the posts pulling out of
the jig. This failuremode is the same as for the preservicetests. Figure 4
shows how the post fits into the test jig that simulatesthe fuselage fitting.
Ii
Figure 3. Static test failureof baggagedoor after 1413
flighthours in New York City area. Areas of
disbond of outer skin-to-coreis shown.
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IInner composite_ Outer.
structure composite
door skin
< Post
Test jig
Figure 4. Attachmentof lower litter door post to static test jig.
It was thought that, although the failuremode was not a compositestructural
failure, it might be related to a loss in structuralstiffness,which could
cause excessive rotation at the end posts. Therefore, deflection data was
taken during the test of the door that was returnedfrom Island Helicoptersto
see if there was any loss of stiffness. Figure 5 is a comparisonof deflec-
tions, at one location, between this door and the average of three doors
tested before service. The figure shows a substantialloss of stiffnessafter
1413 hours of service. This could have caused the posts to slip out at a low
load, despitethe fact that the door apparentlysufferedno loss of structural
strength.
Although only three sets of componentshave been tested,and only one year of
servicehas been accumulatedon the parts, some observationscan be made. The
13
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Figure5. Load-deflectioncomparisonof litterdoor
before service and after 1413 hours of
flight in New York City area.
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_ first is that the only graphite component, the vertical fin, showedno signs
of structural degradation. In fact, all three of the exposed fins were
_ strongerthan the averageof the preservicefins.
The Kevlar components did not fare as well as the graphite fin. After one
year of service, they showed some loss of strength and/or stiffness. The
losses, however, were not sufficientlyconsistent to indicate a definite
trend. Additional data, taken over longer service periods, are requiredbe-
fore any conclusioncan be drawn. These shouldbe forthcomingas the program
continues.
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_ 3. EXPOSURE COUPONS
Coupons for environmentaltesting are locatedon exposure racks in five areas
in the continentalUnited States, Canada, and Alaska. Their specific loca-
tions are noted in Table 4. The test coupons are made from the same mate-
rials, and with the same ply layups as the externalsurfacesof the composite
components. A descriptionof the coupons and the exposure racks is given in
-- Referencei.
_ After a year's exposure, one-fifth of the specimens (76) were removed from
each of the five racks and sent to NASA-LangleyResearch Center for testing.
Tension, compression,and short beam shear tests were performed, and the re-
sults were compared with tests performed on unexposed specimens. Table 4,
which was taken from Reference2, summarizesthe coupon tests by comparingthe
results with those of the baseline (unexposed)coupons. The data shown are
based on averagetest values.
Examination of Table 4 reveals no strength loss in the graphite specimens.
_ The reduction of 3% (two tension and one short beam shear) is well within
normal scatter.
The Kevlar specimens show no significantreductionin tensile strength,but
there is a definite loss in the matrix-dominatedcompressionand short beam
shear strengths. Two facts are noticeable. The first is that the baggage
door specimensshow strengthlosses in all of the environments,with the maxi-
- mum loss being in the specimensexposed to cold climates. The other is that
the fairings and litter door couponsexhibitsignificantstrength losses only
- after being exposed to a cold climate.
_ Severalqualitativetheorieshave been advancedconcerningloss of strengthof
Kevlar/epoxy after prolonged environmentalexposure. They will not be put
forth here except to state that they all are concernedwith the fact that the
Kevlar fiber absorbsmoisture, and also that the fibers do not adhere to the
matrix as well as one would desire. Under prolongedcold-wet exposure,there
-- 16
TABLE 4. EFFECT OF ONE YEAR OF GROUND-BASEDEXPOSUREON
STRENGTHOF COUPONSOF COMPOSITEMATERIALS
USED TO FABRICATE206L COMPONENTS
StrengthRetention
Materials Ratio1
-- and Fiber Exposure
Component Orientation Location SBS2 Comp Ten
-- Litter door Kevlar-49/epoxy Cameron,LA 0.98 1.01 1.02
Style 281 cloth 0il platform 0.95 0.99 1.00
0/45/0 Hampton,VA 1.02 0.97 1.05
_ Toronto,Canada 0.96 1.00 1.04
Ft. Greeley,AK 0.93 0.90 1.03
Baggage door Kevlar-49/epoxy Cameron,LA 0.93 0.94 1.03
- Style 120 cloth Oil platform 0.90 0.93 0.99
0/90/±45 Hampton,VA 0.97 0.89 1.00
Toronto,Canada 0.95 0.89 1.04
-- Ft. Greeley,AK 0.88 0.85 1.02
Fwd fairing Kevlar-49/epoxy Cameron,LA 0.98 0.98 1.00
_ Style 281 cloth Oil platform 0.98 0.98 1.00
0/90 Hampton,VA 1.02 1.05 1.05
Toronto,Canada 1.04 0.96 1.04
Ft. Greeley,AK 0.93 0.94 1.03
Vertical fin T300/epoxy Cameron,LA 1.01 1.03 0.97
0/±45/0 Oil platform 1.02 1.00 0.97
-- Hampton,VA 1.02 1.01 1.01
Toronto,Canada 1.00 1.01 1.08
Ft. Greeley,AK 0.97 1.02 1.00
IStrengthretentionratio = strength (exposed)
_ strength (baseline)
2Shortbeam shear
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_ will be a tendency to weaken the bond between the fiber and the matrix. Some
resin systems will adhere to the matrix better than others, but few, if any,
have as good a bond as does graphite or fiberglass.
Each of the three Kevlar/epoxycomponentsused a differentresin system. The
-- forwardfairingused CE 3061 resin,and the litterdoor used F5602 resin. The
baggage door used a Brunswick resin system whose formulation,and therefore
its properties,are proprietary.
Although no definite conclusionscan be drawn from only a year's exposure,it
appears that Kevlar/epoxymay be sensitiveto long-termexposure to a cold,
wet environment. This trend will be closelywatched as the program continues.
IManufacturedby Ferro Corp., Culver City, CA
2Manufacturedby Hexcel Corp., Dublin,CA
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__ 4. MAINTENANCEAND SERVICEPROBLEMS
Since one facet of this program is to monitor the serviceabilityof composite
structures,it will be of interest to discuss some of the "incidents"that
have occurred during approximately27,500 flight hours. It should be noted
-- that although these happened to helicopters, it is probable that similar
"incidents"can happen to fixed-wingaircraftin the light plane category. In
many respects, the maintenance of light planes is similar to light helicop-
ters, so it may be assumedthat their maintenanceproblemswould be about the
same.
4.1 MAINTENANCEINSTRUCTIONS
The kit for each componentcontainsan FAA-approvedServiceInstructionManual
__ (SI). In addition to detailed installationinstructions, the SI contains
repairprocedures for the repairableportionsof each component.
Recognizingthat many of the small operatorshave had little or no experience
working with Kevlar, and that Kevlar is not readilyavailableat most private
-- facilities,all standard Kevlar repairs are made with fiberglassfabric using
wet layup techniques. The graphite fin, however, poses a differentproblem.
The fin is made from a prepreg,unwoven laminateoriented [0/±45/0]along the
upper and lower structuralaxes, becoming isotropicin the area of the fin-to-
_ fuselage intersection. A fiberglass fabric repair would not work well for
this construction,nor would it be practicalto ask the operatorsto lay up a
unidirectionallaminate in the field and try to match the existing laminate
with the repair. Accordingly,it was decided that the fin repairsbe made
with titanium sheet. It was recognized that untreated titanium does not
-- adhere well to other surfaces, including graphite/epoxy. Therefore,when a
fin structuralrepair is required,Bell will treat a piece of titanium for use
-- in the repair. Although this is not an efficientlong-rangeprocedure, it was
adopted for this program.
When damage is incurred whose repair is not coveredby the SI, Bell will send
a representativeto aid the.operator; or in some cases, the component is
- returnedto Bell for rework.
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4.2 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTEREDIN SERVICE
During the course of over 27,500 flight hours, it is inevitable that some
problemswould be encountered. Most of the problemswere minor in nature, and
consisted of such mishaps as locally dented or cracked skins that occurred
during ground handling operations. These were repairedby the operators,and
often without informing Bell. Some of the more significantincidents that
have come to Bell's attentionare discussedbelow.
The vertical fin structurewas pierced when a helicopter was blown into a
sharp object during a windstorm. The accident occurred on an oil rig in the
Gulf of Mexico. Figure 6 shows that the damagewas about 3 inches in diameter
and extendedinto the honeycombcore, but not to the opposite skin.
Figure 6. Damage to graphite/epoxyvertical fin when
piercedby a sharp object.
2O
The repair was made by first cleaning the hole and replacingthe fibertruss
core with fiberglasshoneycombcore. The skins were trimmeddown to the core,
and a buildup of 6AI-4V titaniumsheet was used to make the typicalhoneycomb
sandwich repair. All of the bondingwas done with room temperaturesettingEA
9343 adhesive. Figure 7 shows the repairprior to cleanupand painting. This
repair was made at PetroleumHelicoptersInc. who have the equipmentto treat
titanium at their facility, so it was not necessary to treat it at Bell.
Figure 7. Repair to damagedvertical fin showingtitanium
repairplate prior to cleanupand painting.
3Manufacturedby Dexter Hysol Corp., Pittsburgh,CA
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-- One helicopterreceiveda lightningstrikewhile it was parked at an airfield.
The light on the top of the fin was damagedand had to be replaced. The rest
of the fin was visually examined,but there were no indicationsof damage to
the composite structure. This is consideredto be a validationof the light-
_ ning protection used on the fin. (Thisparticularfin was part of the set of
components that was returned from the Gulf Coast for static test after 840
flight hours.)
One operator attempted to attach an aluminum plate to the inner skin of the
-- baggage door by means of bucked rivets. The rivetingcaused areas of disbond-
ing between the inner skin and the nomex honeycombcore, and also caused some
local crushing of the core. This door was returned to Bell for repair. A
section of the inner skin and crushed core was removed from the door. The
_ core was replaced, and since Bell has the facilities to work with Kevlar,
Kevlar fabricprepregwas used to make the skin repair.
The above incident highlights a fact that is becoming increasinglyclear as
this programproceeds. The small helicopterand light plane operatorsare not
-- familiarwith compositematerials and do not know how to work with them. In
this instance, although they have been instructed to always use pulled or
squeezed rivets, the informationdid not filter through to the men doing the
work, so a failurewas caused by mishandlingthe compositematerial.
Thermal buckling occurred in the outer skins of the litter doors of four
helicoptersparked in the Arizona desert during the summer. For all intents
and purposes, these helicopterswere not flown for the entire summer. Per-
sonnel at this facility said they have taken surfacetemperaturemeasurements
-- on aluminum helicopter structureswith the same externalpaint scheme as the
composite,and it is not unusual for the temperaturesto reach 200° to 225°F
• during the summer. The coefficientof thermal expansion of the plexiglass
window that is bonded to the Kevlar door structure is 4.5 x 10-5 in/in/°F
_ (which is about 3.5 times that of aluminumalloy),and that of Kevlar/epoxyis
0, so the loads caused by the relativethermalexpansionwere large enough to
cause the thermalbuckle shown in Figure 8. This is also evidentby the fact
-- 22
that the bond between the door structureand the window was broken on the four
doors, and the disbondswere in the corner near the buckle.
Figure 8. Thermalbuckling of compositelitter
door after exposureto desert heat.
The four doors were returnedto Bell for rework. They were clampedin the jig
shown in Figure 9 and heated to 220°F for 4 minutes to eliminatethe buckle.
To preclude a reoccurrenceof this type of failure,a rubber seal (Figurei0)
was bonded between the door structureand the window to permit relative ther-
mal expansion between the two. This design was tested to ultimate pressure
before releasingit for service.
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Figure 9. Buckledlitter door in straighteningjig.
4.3 POTENTIALPROBLEMS
In the spring of 1983, two baggage door problems occurred. Althoughneither
situation was the same, both resulted in a disbondedarea between the outer
skin and the nomex honeycombcore.
The Canadian Ministry of Transportreported an incident that occurred in the
hangar while the helicopter was undergoing routine maintenance. A pressure
vessel that is used to inflate the helicopter'sfloats exploded. A mechanic
involuntarilyjumpedback, hit the insideof the open baggagedoor, causingit
to rotate beyond its normal open position. This caused the door's outer skin
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Window
Rubber seal
Kevlar/epoxydoor
Sect A-A (Typ)
Figure i0. Installationof rubber seal to permit relative
-- motionbetweenwindow and door structure.
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to impact the fuselage skin, and break the hinges. An inspection of the
composite revealed the disbonded area shown in Figure ii. The bond of the
core to the inner skin remainedintact,and there was no evidenceof damage to
the fuselage structurewhere the door contacted it. A standard repair was
made using a fiberglasswet layup, and the hinges were replaced.
r
7
_ _Area of disbondof
outer skin fromcore
Broken
hinges
Figure ii. Failureof baggage door at CanadianMinistry of Transport
resultingfrom a groundhandlingmishap.
At about the same time, Bell was informed that there was a "soft" area on an
outer skin of a baggage door of a helicopter operated by Heli-Voyageur in
-- Quebec. An inspectionof the "soft" skin revealed,by tapping,that there was
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a disbonded outer skin-to-corearea approximatelythe same size, and in ap-
proximately the same location as the one shown in Figure ii. There were no
damage marks on either the door or fuselage skin, and the hinges were undam-
aged. The maintenancechief at Heli-Voyageursaid that no one reportedeither
a hard opening or an impactwith a foreignobject. The cause of the disbond,
therefore,remainsunknown.
Although the two incidentsappear to be isolated,the fact that they were both
similar failuresmay not be just coincidence. Also, it must be recalledthat
-- the door that was returned from Island Helicoptersfor test failed at a low
load by extensivedisbondingof the outer skin to the core (Table3 and Figure
3).
These three happeningsappear to form a pattern, and while no conclusionscan
as yet be drawn, this structure will be closely monitored in the future.
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5. CONCLUDINGREMARKS
_ i. As of 1 August 1983, 34 helicoptershave reported a total of 27,517
flight service hours on the four compositetest components,for an aver-
age of 809.3 hours per helicopter. The high-timehelicopteraccumulated
2244 hours in the Gulf Coast area.
2. Three sets of components were returned to Bell for static test after
approximately one year's service. The graphite/epoxyfins showed no
signs of structural degradation. The tests of the Kevlar/epoxycompo-
nents gave inconsistentresults. The forwardfairingshowed no signs of
structural degradation, but the two doors exhibited a slight loss in
strengthand/or stiffnessas comparedwith the preservicetests.
3. After a year's exposure, one-fifth of the exposure specimens were re-
turned to NASA-Langley Research Center for test. The graphite/epoxy
specimens showed no loss of strength. The Kevlar/epoxyspecimens,how-
ever, showed a loss of strength of up to 15% in the matrix-dominated
-- (shortbeam shear and compression)properties. This loss of strengthap-
pears to be most prevalent in the specimens that were located in cold
_ climates.
__ 4. The only significantfailures in the field occurredon the litterdoors,
and were in the form of skin buckles, which were causedby differential
thermal expansionbetween the Kevlar/epoxyskin and the plexiglass win-
dow. The skin was repaired,and the deficiencywas eliminatedby insert-
ing a rubber seal between the skin and the window to absorb the relative
-- thermalmotion.
5. Although it is too early to draw any definiteconclusions,there appears
to be a trend toward reduced strength and/or stiffness in the Kevlar/
_ epoxy doors that were exposed to a cold, moist climate for long periods
of time. This trend seems to be followinga similar one that showed up
on the exposure specimens. The effect will be closelywatched as more
test data is accumulated.
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